Here is the best work I have seen on VIN fraud.
LINK
Straight to the point: Let there be no doubt that it is illegal to tamper with a VIN on a vehicle or even the parts of a vehicle.
This is not an all inclusive list of state laws/statutes. It is merely a sampling. Do not assume because a state is not mentioned here that there are no such laws in that state (country).
Legal research/reference provided by Sam Mamola, J.D.
18 USCS § 2321
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I. CRIMES
CHAPTER 113. STOLEN PROPERTY
18 USCS § 2321 (2003)
§ 2321. Trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts
(a) Whoever buys, receives, possesses, or obtains control of, with intent to sell or otherwise dispose of, a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, knowing that an identification number for such motor vehicle or part has been removed, obliterated, tampered with, or altered, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
107 A.L.R.5th 567
SUMMARY: Illegally removing or altering a vehicle identification number (VIN) or selling or possessing a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN constitutes a crime in most states. In order to impose liability, state courts normally require a culpable mental state on the part of the defendant in altering or removing a VIN or in possessing a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN. Some states, however, do not require any culpable mental state on the part of the defendant when selling a vehicle or vehicle part with a removed or altered VIN.
For example, in State v. Smith, 972 S.W.2d 476, 107 A.L.R.5th 791 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998), the defendant sold a vehicle that was subsequently found to have an altered VIN. The defendant claimed the state was required to establish that he had knowledge of the VIN alteration at the time the sale occurred. The court held that while knowledge was required for possessing a vehicle with an altered VIN, the statute's plain language indicated that knowledge was not required when selling a vehicle with an altered VIN.
Most state courts held that knowledge of the altered or removed VIN is required before the defendant can be convicted of altering or removing a VIN or possessing or selling a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN ( § 10[a] ). However, a few courts have concluded that from a plain reading of the applicable statute, knowledge of the altered or removed VIN is not required when altering or removing a VIN or possessing or selling a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN ( § 10 ). Courts singled out a number of particular circumstances as tending to establish knowledge of an altered or removed VIN on the part of the defendant. For instance, knowledge was found to exist where there is physical evidence of the VIN alteration as well as proof the defendant tried to sell the vehicle or had possession of the vehicle for a long period of time ( § 10[c] ). Knowledge was also proved by evidence that the defendant was warned of a missing or altered VIN and did not correct the defect or where the police found evidence of a "chop shop" and other dismantled vehicle parts in the defendant's possession ( § 10[c] ). To the contrary, courts found the defendant did not have knowledge of an altered or removed VIN where, although there was evidence of possession or sale of the vehicle, there was no direct or physical evidence the defendant altered or removed the VIN ( § 10[d] ). Knowledge was also not proved where the defendant merely leased a building to a person operating a "chop shop" and did not know what was happening inside the building ( § 10[d] ).
Along with the culpable mental state requirement, courts also addressed the criminal conduct involved in altering or removing a VIN or possessing or selling a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN. For example, state courts found that a VIN was altered or removed even if the concealed VIN was not removed or the vehicle bore an additional VIN not affixed by the manufacturer ( § 12[a] ).
Delaware:
In Tackett v. State, 416 A.2d 1225 (Del. 1980), the court held that two statutes: (1) the possession of a vehicle with a removed VIN (Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6709); and (2) the possession of a vehicle with knowledge that the VIN is falsified with intent to misrepresent the identity (Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6705(d)) were not unconstitutionally vague. The court noted that the standard for judging the certainty of a criminal statute is whether it is specific enough to give notice to a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct prohibited. Consequently, the court found Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6705(d) clearly comports with constitutional standards of specificity in that the statute unambiguously describes both the conduct prohibited and the requisite states of mind. The court also found that Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6709 was not vague as applied to this case because the indictment charged that the defendant knew of the altered VINs; the defendant was in the auto repair business and a former employee of a major automaker, giving rise to a fair inference that he was familiar with confidential VINs; and the defendant's knowledge that the VINs had been altered was charged and proven.
New York:
The court held in People v. Giese, 95 Misc. 2d 792, 408 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup 1978), order aff'd without published op, 68 A.D.2d 1019, 414 N.Y.S.2d 947 (2d Dep't 1979), that federal law (Federal Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381 et seq. (Repl.; see 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 30101 et seq.)) did not preempt N.Y. Penal Law § 170.70, which makes it illegal to possess a VIN that has been removed from a vehicle or vehicle part to which the VIN was affixed by the manufacturer in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Motor Vehicle and Information Cost Savings Act. The court noted that the promulgation of the safety standards cannot be said to be so pervasive of the area to prevent the state of New York from enacting and enforcing laws with respect to the illegal possession of VIN plates in order to reduce the incidence of motor vehicle theft. Consequently, the court held that such legislation was not in conflict with the purpose or language of the Federal Safety Act.
Maryland:
In interpreting Md. Ann. Code art. 66 1/2, § 73 (1957), which prohibits a person from knowingly possessing or selling a vehicle or vehicle part with an altered or removed VIN, for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the identity of the vehicle or vehicle part, the court in Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194, 259 A.2d 89 (1969), concluded that "knowingly" as used in the statute means "having knowledge." A person thus may be found to have knowledge by evidence establishing that one has actual or direct knowledge of the VIN removal or alteration. For example, explained the court, actual knowledge is when one removes or alters the number personally, while direct knowledge is when one admits to knowing that the number has been removed or altered, and has no reasonable nonculpable explanation as to why it has been removed or altered.
Missouri:
The court in State v. Smith, 972 S.W.2d 476, 107 A.L.R.5th 791 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1998), held that the plain language of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 301.390.1, 301.390.6 (1994) does not require criminal intent when selling a vehicle with an altered or removed VIN. The statute's language prohibits a person from selling or offering for sale, or knowingly having the custody or possession of a motor vehicle with an altered or removed VIN. The court said that the legislature clearly and deliberately wrote the statute so that "knowingly" refers only to the crime of custody or possession, and not to the crime of selling or offering for sale. The requirement that the defendant know the VIN was altered or removed in order to be convicted thus applies only to the crime of custody or possession, and not to the crime of sale.
Knowledge found:
The courts in the following cases held that the defendant knowingly altered or removed a vehicle identification number (VIN) or sold or possessed a vehicle or vehicle part knowing it had an altered or removed VIN.